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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in order to establish a
set of international rules and norms for conducting trade among nations. The
objective of the organization is not only to strive towards a more harmonious
and equitable playing field within the global market, but to "rais[e] standards of
living, ensur[e] full employment, and expand the production of and trade in
goods and services. . . ." Despite the organization's recognition "that there is
need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, especially
the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development,, 2 many
WTO agreements have created discord between developed and developing
nations with respect to implementing these goals.
One particular WTO agreement, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), has created a great deal of debate about
the usefulness of international intellectual property rights. Will they result in
increased trade and fairer global competition or will they simply strengthen the
West's hold on the international economy as they increase western multination-
als' profits and weed out competitors from developing nations? Although the
process for developing and ratifying TRIPS was preceded with extensive debate
among WTO members,3 there remain a number of disagreements among nations
in regard to the interpretation and enforcement of TRIPS. The main divide
exists between developed nations and developing nations due to their diverging
national interests, which stem from their different levels of economic develop-
ment.4 The developing nation members, with their limited research, develop-
ment, and manufacturing capacities, took a leap of faith when they committed
to adopting and enforcing strong, non-discriminatory minimum standards of
intellectual property rights.5 Although it will take years to confirm whether this
commitment will result in the foreign investment and domestic economic
growth they aspire to obtain, these nations are under potent domestic pressure
to produce tangible results in a short timeframe. However, these expectations
cannot be met simply by strengthening intellectual property laws, but require
numerous other changes to interrelated legal regimes.
i. Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155, 33
I.LM., Preamble.
2. Id.
3. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN 0. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 962-64 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the
various disputes between developing and developed nations).
4. Id.
5, Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (1998).
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This Note focuses on TRIPS' impact on the pharmaceutical industry as
well as health care in developing nations. By using Egypt as a case study, this
Note aims to emphasize that the benefits of TRIPS for developing nations
depends on the linkage between intellectual property rights (IPR) and other
legal regimes, particularly drug regulation, technology transfer, and foreign
direct investment (FDI) policies. The failure to adopt a holistic approach to the
creation of effective and beneficial intellectual property rights regimes will
merely increase the western pharmaceuticals' market share and increase drug
prices in developing nations.6 By asking whether Egypt, versus foreign multi-
national companies, is likely to benefit from its new IPR law (that is for the
most part TRIPS compliant) 7 one has to analyze the entire context in which the
law exists. This in turn will expose the importance of various factors relevant
to fulfilling the expected benefits of stronger IPRs in developing nations in
general.
Consequently, Section I provides a brief description of the ongoing debate
between the developed and developing nations in regard to the costs and bene-
fits of international pharmaceutical patents. Section II outlines and describes
the controversial provisions in TRIPS and how they are addressed, adequately
or inadequately, in Egypt's new IPR law. Section m then analyzes the context
in which the new IPR law is being introduced including the structure of Egypt's
pharmaceutical industry and national health care system. Section IV addresses
other legal regimes and policies, such as research and development, technology
transfer, and competition policy, which are inextricably linked to the efficacy
of intellectual property rights. Finally, Section V offers recommendations on
how Egypt can fully benefit from its commitment to TRIPS and its new IPR
law, which can then be extrapolated to other developing nations in similar
circumstances.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS ON PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS
A. Developed Nations' Perspectives
The global pharmaceutical industry is a technology intensive and science-
based industry, which can be divided into three categories: chemicals (or bulk
6. See id. at 112-13 (admitting that developing countries' interests in promoting foreign direct
investment, trade, and technological expertise is linked to numerous broader programs including stronger IPR
regimes).
7. Hadia Mostafa, Standing Up For Your Rights, BUSINESs TODAY EGYPT, Aug. 2002, available
at www.businesstodayegypt.com/issues/0208n'BEB/02087BEB.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see infra
subpart II of this note for ways in which it may not be TRIPS compliant.
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drugs), intermediates, and formulations (or medicine ready for consumption).,
Only a few developed countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA) in the world have the
sufficiently sophisticated pharmaceutical industry and significant research base
necessary to conduct complex research and development activities.9 The
remaining nations can either reverse engineer already discovered drugs, produce
therapeutic ingredients and finished goods, or do nothing with regard to pro-
ducing even the most basic pharmaceutical products."
These factors have created a small group of pharmaceutical multinational
enterprises (MNE) worldwide" that possess significant influence in the forma-
tion of their home nation's domestic policy, particularly in the United States. 2
Hence it is predominantly their business concerns that determine developed
nations' approaches to implementing IPRs on an international scale. As the
focus of competition is increasingly on innovation and invention, the cost of
creative activities is increasing, as is the ease of copying these activities. 3 For
example, the large up-front investments of $200 to $500 million, which amount
to approximately 18% of product sales, necessary to develop a new chemical
entity 14 can only be returned through higher profits captured during the patent
period. Patents create more certainty of potential profits at the end of the
research cycle and decrease the risk of investment."' Therefore, the most
effective way of protecting profit margins from being eroded by cheap generic
drugs is through internationally enforceable patent rights. 6  These business
8. Assad Omer, Access to Medicines: Transfer of Technology and Capacity Building, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 551 (2002).
9. Id.; see THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN EGYPT, THE EGYPTIAN PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 1 (2001), available at http://www.amcham.org (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (stating that the United
States controls 40% of the total world sales in pharmaceuticals) [hereinafter Amcham].
10. Omer, supra note 8, at 551.
11. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52-54
(Institute for International Economics 2000) (describing the international pharmaceutical industry as being
hierarchical and very competitive. There are a small number of large MNEs based in the USA, Switzerland,
Germany, United Kingdom, and Japan that conduct most of the private sector R&D. The remaining majority
of pharmaceuticals are based worldwide and predominantly produce generic drugs.).
12. Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize
Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World
Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1075-78 (1996).
13. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Id. at 52-54; Jayashree Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, Prices, and Welfare Losses: Policy
Options For India Under The WTO TRIPS Agreement, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 733, 739
(2000).
15. Jean 0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property And The Availability of Pharmaceuticals in Poor
Countries 12 (CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, Working Paper No. 5, 2002).
16. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 2; see also JACKSON ET. AL., supra note 3, at 926 (citing a 1988 study
by the United States International Trade Commission that concludes that $24 billion is lost annually due to
inadequate intellectual property protection abroad).
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considerations have translated into significant pressure by developed nations
onto developing nations to strictly conform to TRIPS via domestic laws in
return for other concessions.'
7
However, much of the developed nations' discoursejustifying international
IPRs does not revolve around their MNEs' economic interests, for obvious
political reasons, but rather emphasizes the global benefits of intellectual pro-
perty rights in general.' 8 By providing private firms with a monopoly over the
sale and distribution of their patented goods for a fixed period of time, 9 IPRs
are supposed to create incentives for research and development (R&D) activi-
ties" in every nation's private sectors. Developing nations' ensuing concerns
with high pharmaceutical prices and inaccessibility to important medicines are
countered with the theory that too much access caused by weak IPRs will create
more inaccessibility in the long run, resulting in the stagnancy of new drug dis-
coveries." Ultimately, the economic incentives derived from monopoly power
of individual pharmaceuticals will benefit overall global welfare through the
discovery of new drugs and therapies that cure debilitating, if not fatal,
diseases.22
Developed nations emphasize their belief that these benefits will not be
limited to their MNEs, but will also assist local firms in developing nations to
establish their own R&D activities, which will be better suited to local needs. 23
Many scholars note that one particular disadvantage of the current laxity in IPR
17. Michelle M. Nerozzi, The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries
Being 'TRIPped' By Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REv. 605, 616-17 (2002); MASKUS, supra note 11,
at 4. See Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries and Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 47, 59 (2002) (citing concessions in textiles and agriculture as one incentive for developing nations to sign
onto TRIPS).
18. See Sykes, supra note 17, at 55-59 (providing a general discussion of the pros and cons of
intellectual property rights from an economic perspective).
19. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 291 (Kluwer Law International 2001); MASKUS, supra note 11, at 40-41. For patents, 20 years
is the international standard protection period. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Article
33 Legal Instruments, Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31 (1994), 33 LL.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
20. See Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: "Heartless
Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?" (NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working Paper 6366,
1998) (admitting that the stimulation of R&D is a possible welfare benefit, but not a guarantee), available at
www.nber.org/papers/w6366 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
21. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 30.
22. Id. ("The main goal of an intellectual property system should be to create economic incentives
that maximize the discounted present value of the difference between the social benefits and the social costs
of information creation, including the costs of administering the system."); A survey of 12 manufacturing
industries (including the chemical industry) concluded that 30% of inventions would not have been developed
without patent protection because research and development is high and imitation is easy. Id. at 43.
23. Id. at 33-34.
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laws in developing nations is the lack of focus by pharmaceutical MNEs on
diseases prevalent in developing nation illnesses.24 For example, currently 99%
of the global disease burden is concentrated in the low and middle-income
countries, but only 4.3% of global health-related R&D expenditures address
those diseases. 2' Therefore, IPRs will support innovative behavior that adapts
existing technologies to local needs of which the cumulative effect can ignite
growth in knowledge and economic activity. 26 The local firms will also have
an equal opportunity to sell their products abroad in order to reap the higher
profits currently enjoyed by western MNEs that own the majority of existing
pharmaceutical patents.27
Additional expected benefits from this process include the dissemination
of knowledge through required patent disclosures, which can be used as inputs
for more innovation,2" the transfer of technology through foreign direct invest-
ment from wealthy to poor nations with stable IPR regimes,29 and the facilitation
of contracting between firms which will increase the production of drugs and
the efficiency of the R&D process for new drugs.3" IPR laws may also prove to
be of more assistance to local firms than international firms in protecting their
intellectual property because the former do not have the large resources
necessary to prevent infringement nor the option to withdraw from the market
as a means of protecting their profit base.'
Finally, the creation of global IPRs is supposed to provide developing
nations with more access to up-to-date technologies through technology
transfer.32 Weak IPR regimes cause developing nations to have retarded tech-
nological development limited to outdated technologies and become isolated
from new technologies with the only solution being to build their own
technological knowledge from scratch, a nearly impossible mission given their
24. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 2-5, 7 (acknowledging that stronger IPRs in developing nations will
lead to R&D on "neglected diseases" as well as the development of products more tailored to the specific
needs of poor countries).
25. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 8-9 (also noting that only 0.2% of global R&D is spent on
pneumonia, dierrheal diseases, and tuberculosis which are all prevalent in developing countries and account
for 18% of the total global disease burden).
26. Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic
Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 460 (2001).
27. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 40-41.
28. Id.; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 5.
29. See Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 1, 5 (concluding that MNEs will be more willing to license
patented innovations to local manufacturing firms for production); see also MASKUS, supra note 11, at 181
(qualifying the technology transfer benefits to developing nations with strong imitative and manufacturing
capabilities, hence the least developed countries are unlikely to experience much technology transfer).
30. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 5.
31. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 190.
32. Omer, supra note 10, at 558; see also TRIPS supra note 19, at art. 66.2.
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economic constraints.33 On the other hand, with strong IPRs, foreign MNEs
should be more willing to commit to foreign direct investment, 34 joint ventures,
and licensing agreements in developing countries.3" Developed nations empha-
size that the possibility of an increase in foreign direct investment (developing
nations' most preferred form of technology transfer) "in complex but easily
copied technologies [such as pharmaceuticals] is likely to increase as IPRs are
strengthened. 36 Through the shipment of advanced inputs to subsidiaries,
MNEs will indirectly share blueprints, product designs, and skilled producer
services with the local market. 37 Technology transfer can also occur through
trade in technologically advanced inputs that will raise importers' productivity
and reduce their production costs. 38 Without strong IPR laws, not only will FDI
hesitate to move east and south, but many foreign producers may refuse to
export their high-tech goods in order to protect their global profit margins.
Therefore, the onus is on the developing world to create a business environment
friendly to the needs of wealthy, western multinationals.
B. Developing Nations' Perspectives
Although the aforementioned arguments facially appear to be sound and
reasonable, developing countries often emphasize the disparity between what
is theoretically supposed to occur after the implementation of IPRs and what
actually materializes. 39 They complain that IPRs have a negligible impact on
R&D incentives in their economies as they simply raise prices on patented
drugs,4° transfer rents to foreign pharmaceutical patent holders, and create dead-
weight losses as the consumers willing to pay the marginal cost of medicines are
33. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 55.
34. See Maskus, supra note 5, at 111 (defining foreign direct investment as "the establishment or
acquisition of production subsidiaries abroad by multinational enterprises"); see also Nerozzi, supra note 17,
at 621 (citing a 1994 World Bank study that 86%-100% of developed country pharmaceutical companies
based their decisions on whether or not to invest in a country on the amount of patent protection offered to
them by the host country).
35. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 138.
36. Maskus, supra note 5, at 133.
37. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 137.
38. Id. at 150.
39. UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The TRIPS Agreement and The
Built-In Agenda: Background Paper, 4 (Jan. 1, 2002) ("several developing countries wish to re-open the
TRIPS Agreement which they consider has proven to be unable to reach its main objectives and has put a
disproportionate burden on developing countries without providing them with commensurate benefits"),
available at www.unctad.org/sections/comdip/docs/en//webcdpbkgd3-en.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003); see
also JACKSON ET. AL, supra note 3, at 926 ("[d]eveloping countries tend to have lower levels of human capital
... thus [have] perhaps less capacity in relation to their size to generate commercially valuable innovations.").
40. See Maskus, supra note 26, at 469 (citing the increase in pharmaceutical prices in India, of up
to 50%, after the implementation of patents).
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priced out of the market." Moreover, the claim that more global R&D will be
directed towards developing nations' diseases may prove to be illusive due to
the low per capita incomes of their consumers. One expert on India predicted
that if you assume there are 20 MNEs in a market as large India, each MNE
would earn $2-3 million per product, which is significantly less than the re-
quired $200 to $500 million R&D expenditures. Therefore, "R&D for pharma-
ceuticals [that are] relevant only to a few developing countries [will] less likely
take place, even with full TRIPS implementation. 42 Another scholar notes that
the losses experienced from the transfer of monopoly rents from developing
nations to developed nations greatly exceed any benefits to developing nations
of the new drugs entering the market due to patent protection.43 For example,
"to compensate for the loss of domestic surplus ... as a result of higher drug
prices for existing patented products, a threefold increase in the number of
equivalent new products reaching [developing countries] would be required."'
The issue at the forefront of this debate is the accessibility to essential
medicines.45 Before TRIPS was ratified, developing nations' ability to imitate
foreign products and technologies without paying royalty fees was their primary
means of making medicine affordable for their large, poor populations as well
as a means of limiting the costs of health care.' The lack of national health care
insurance magnifies the importance of cheap medicine since most consumers
pay for drugs directly from their low GDP per capita incomes.47 These GDP per
capita incomes48 are much lower than developed nations per capita incomes
41. Sykes, supra note 17, at 3; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 16; Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage
of Intellectual Property And International Trade in The TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match
Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 713, 755 (1999).
42. WATAL, supra note 19, at 739.
43. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 362-66 (John
Greenman ed., Harper Collins College Publishers 1996).
44. F. M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2259 (2000).
45. UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The TRIPs Agreement and the
Built-In Agenda: Background Paper, 3 (Jan. 1,2002), available at www.unctad.org/sections/comdip/docs/en//
webcdpbkgd3_en.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. See generally Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001) (stating the concerns of
developing countries with regard to the drawbacks of stronger intellectual property regimes), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min0l_e/mindecltrips.e.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
46. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34, 53-54; see Watal, supra note 14, at 747 (describing a
simulation of the Indian pharmaceutical market concluding that prices are likely to increase and welfare is
likely to decrease after the enforcement of patent rights).
47. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 10; see MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34 (noting that higher
pharmaceutical prices will raise costs to health care providers and consumers).
48. See THE WORLD BANK, 2002 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 18-20 tbl. 1.1 (listing various
gross national income per capita for developed as well as developing countries).
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when they decided to fully implement IPRs in their economies. 49 Therefore,
developing nations feel unduly coerced into prematurely implementing a legal
regime that has not been preceded with the same degree of economic develop-
ment and industrialization that existed in developed nations preceding their
enforcement of IPRs.50
In addition to specific public health concerns, developing nations have
broader macroeconomic issues such as the erosion of the terms of trade, com-
petitive abuses by foreign MNEs, and employment losses within the generic
drug-producing firms.5' As technology importers, developing nations are con-
cerned that stronger IPRs will expand the market power of foreign providers of
information and new products, giving them more leverage to increase prices on
their goods. As MNEs repatriate these higher profits abroad, the nation experi-
ences a larger trade deficit and outflow of foreign currency, causing a decrease
in the nation's terms of trade.52 However, this phenomenon is highly dependent
on the market structure, demand elasticity, and competition policies within the
economy,53 which reemphasizes the importance of linking IPR regimes with
other policies in order to avoid simplistic conclusions by either side about their
interactions.
The increased market power may also lead to competitive abuses such as
the "cartelization" of horizontal competitors through licensing agreements that
fix prices, limit output, or divide markets,54 patent pooling,55 and cross-licensing
agreements between competing licensors.56 Individual and patent-pooled licen-
sors can also hinder the entrance of new competing technologies through
exclusive grant-back provisions,57 purchase exclusive rights to competing
technologies and products as a means of increasing market power and creating
49. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 39 tbl. 1.
50. See Maskus, supra note 26, at 460 (describing how Japan's post-war patent system promoted
Japanese technical progress by encouraging incremental and adaptive innovation in order to promote diffusion
of knowledge throughout the manufacturing sector).
51. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 33-34.
52. Id. at 159; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 1.
53. See MASKUS, supra note 11, at 159 (defining the market structure to include the number of total
firms competing with rights holders, the type of competition, the ease of market entry and exit, quality
differentiation among products, openness to trades, and wholesale and retail distribution mechanisms).
54. Id. at 206-07.
55. Dorothy G. Raymond, Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling For Standard Setting Organizations,
16 SUM ANTITRUST 41 (2002) ("A patent pool is an agreement by multiple owners of IPR to interchange
licenses or to grant licenses to third parties.... Patent pools can enable the spread of technology, lower
consumer prices, and foster competition, but they can also limit innovation, restrict output, and raise prices.").
56. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 206-07.
57. Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent Misuse Defense - Does It Still have
Vitality?, 708 PLI/PAT 213, 242 (2002) (defining grant back provisions as "require[ingl the licensee to grant
back to the licensor rights that the licensee may acquire or develop").
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horizontal mergers, and initiate bad-faith litigation and opposition proceedings
as a means of harassing and discouraging competitors from entering the
market.58 Although the degree of impact from such practices depends on the
market structure and regulatory framework of a nation, they are particularly
detrimental to developing nations with weak institutions. Hence the reduction
in competition ultimately harms consumers by increasing the prices of goods,
which is particularly devastating with respect to access to basic medicines.
Finally, the link between strong IPRs and technology transfer is not as
direct as some proclaim. There are immediate opportunity costs to implement-
ing stronger IPRs. The elimination of imitative activities does stop some level
of learning, albeit a much lower level than if true FDI existed, by the locals that
is produced via reverse engineering.59 The jobs created by imitative and copy-
ing activities will also be eliminated in countries with pre-existing high un-
employment rates.6°
Although stronger IPRs may indeed encourage more participation of
foreign firms with superior technological capabilities, the manner of participa-
tion is what matters. A patent must be worked locally to induce technology
transfer.6 Foreign direct investment that results in "the successful learning of
information and the know-how to use it by one party from another party"62 is
what developing nations hope to receive in return for strengthening their IPRs.
The spillover effects of on-the-job training, expanded management expertise,
the learning of new technologies, and the training of suppliers are additional
incentives for seeking FDI.63 Therefore licensing agreements, which some
economists believe are more likely to result from stronger IPRs and subsequent
increased certainty in contracting, insufficiently transfer information, know-
how, and technology to the market.64
As the aforementioned discussion highlights, the issues relating to TRIPS
and global IPRs are complex and can be articulated in significantly different
ways depending on a nation's economic and social constraints. One must fully
understand the details of a nation's disposition in order to appreciate the burdens
it faces in meeting its international commitments while maintaining its national
58. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 206-07.
59. Id. at 136.
60. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 60-62 (listing unemployment rates for numerous
developing nations).
61. Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L 365, 374 (2002).
62. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 136.
63. Id. at 152.
64. See id. at 123 (recognizing that as IPRs increase, MNEs no longer have to worry about local
imitation of their products, therefore they are more willing to license out production to local firms since it is
often cheaper then setting up a subsidiary due to non-IPR related costs).
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integrity and economic survival. The following sections will shift to a more
focused analysis of what one particular developing country, Egypt, is experienc-
ing with respect to TRIPS. A brief comparison of Egypt's new IPR law with
TRIPS will be followed by an assessment of the legal and social context in
which this new law was passed.
Ill. A COMPARISON OF TRIPS WITH EGYPT'S NEW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW
A. A Brief Description of TRIPS Standards
The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights was adopted
on April 15, 1994 at the Uruguay Rounds in Marrakesh, Morocco. The agree-
ment set out to establish minimum international standards, versus complete
harmonization, for intellectual property rights with the requirement that
individual member nations enact local laws to enforce the agreed upon rights.
65
Although it incorporates previous agreements such as the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property of 1967, Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1970, and the Washington Treaty,'
TRIPS aims to improve perceived weaknesses in these agreements. 6 Under its
purview of protection are copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications,
industrial designs, patents, integrated circuits, and undisclosed information or
"trade secrets." 6 Member nations must provide the procedures, remedies, and
dispute resolution processes associated with the enforcement of intellectual
property rights. For example, each member nation must allow for civil injunc-
tive remedies to prevent infringement of rights, provide a means by which rights
holders can gain the cooperation of customs authorities to stop infringing goods
from entering the nation, and establish contact points in relevant agencies in
order to distribute information about counterfeit or pirated goods.69 All laws,
measures, and decisions affecting the enforcement of intellectual property rights
65. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 611.
66. See TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 1(3), 2; see Gutowski, supra note 41, at 718-25 (describing
the history of the Paris and Berne Conventions and how they lead up to the adoption of TRIPS); see also
Benedicte Callan, Pirates on the High Seas: The United States and Global Intellectual Property Right,
COLUMBIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ONLINE, at www.ciaonet.org/book/callan/index.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2003).
67. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 611; see Gutowski, supra note 41, at 724 (listing "lack of
harmonization, disparate national treatment, and deficient enforcement and dispute resolutions" as
shortcomings in the Paris and Berne Conventions).
68. See generally TRIPS, supra note 19, at Part IH §§ 1-8 ("Standards Concerning the Availability,
Scope, and Use of Intellectual Property Rights").
69. Callan, supra note 66.
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must be published and available to the public. Because TRIPS aims for mini-
mum standardization rather than complete harmonization, the national IPR legal
and regulatory regimes of individual member nations can vary to accommodate
local constraints as long as the general provisions of TRIPS are adhered to.70
However, it is this inherent flexibility that has caused the ongoing debates, as
discussed in the previous section, 7' among nations with respect to textual
interpretation.
Under TRIPS, patents can be obtained for any invention, whether it is a
product or a process, that is new, involves an inventive step, is non-obvious, and
is useful or capable of industrial application.72 The rights of the patent holder,
which must last at least 20 years from the date of filing of the patent application,
include the right to prevent unauthorized persons from making, using, selling,
or importing any product covered by the patent. If the patent is for a process,
then the patent holder can stop unauthorized use, sale, or importation of pro-
73ducts directly obtained through that process. However, products or processes
that endanger the public order or morality; diagnostic, therapeutic drugs, or sur-
gical methods; plants and animals; and biological processes are not necessarily
eligible for patent protection.7"
Furthermore, the agreement does take into consideration the problems of
developing nations as exemplified in the extended transition periods granted for
implementation of TRIPS provisions, 75 exclusion of certain items from patent-
ability,76 compulsory licensing under certain conditions, 77 parallel importing,78
and technical and financial cooperation in favor of developing member
nations.79 These provisions have caused the most heated debates among
member nations, and thus will be discussed in detail in the following section.
70. NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., EGYPT: OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS UNDER THE GATT/WTO
AGREEMENTS 50-51 (Aug. 1999) (document on file with author).
71. See supra subparts I(A-B) for a detailed discussion on controversies between developed and
developing nations.
72. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 28.
73. NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., supra note 70, at 50.
74. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 27; Callan, supra note 66.
75. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 66 (allowing least developed countries to enjoy a transitional
period of 10 years from the date of application).
76. See UNCTAD, supra note 45, at 2 ("plants and animals may be excluded from patentability,
however, micro organisms cannot"). Consequently, developing countries want to clarify the definition of
microorganism in order to ensure greater legal certainty, avoid biopiracy, and assure fair access to genetic
resources. Id.
77. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31.
78. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 6 (excluding the issue of parallel imports from the dispute
settlement system).
79. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 612.
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B. An Overview of Egypt's Intellectual Property Law 82 of 2002
Law No. 82 of 2002 Promulgating Intellectual Property Law was passed
on June 2, 2002 after a seven-year drafting process and two years of formal
debate. 80 The new law constituted a comprehensive and historic improvement
in the legal rights of inventors, artists, and entrepreneurs.8 The section on
patents replaced the outdated Law 132 of 1949,82 which only protected the
manufacturing process rather than the finished pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical product.83 Additional shortcomings of Law 132 include an overly
broad compulsory licensing provision, a forfeiture requirement if the patent is
not worked two years after the issuance of the first compulsory license, a
fifteen-year term of protection, and a definition of infringement that did not
include the use, sale, or importation of products made using the processes
patented in Egypt.' Although the new law resolves some of these issues, there
remains pressure from abroad to change some provisions, particularly
compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and enforcement provisions, which will
be discussed in more detail below.
Each ministry is currently developing its own executive regulations85 to
implement and enforce the provisions of the law.86 Because these executive
80. Egypt Considers New Patent Law, 8 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 19 (1996); Emad Mekay,
Egypt: Poverty, Police, and the Ballad of Intellectual Property, INTER PRESS SERVICE, 2002 WL 4912920,
Feb. 19, 2002; see ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST,
Aug. 1, 1998, at 2, http://stote.eiu.com.cart.asp?action=browse&layout=car-article_list&product-id=
23574802 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (stating that United States' experts have been working with the Egyptian
government since 1993 in drafting a new patent law).
81. Law 82 of 2002 is divided into four books that are individually assigned to a specific ministry's
profile for enforcement purposes. Book one addresses patents, utility models, semiconductor topography, and
undisclosed information and falls under the Ministry of State for Scientific Research and the Ministry of
Health. Book two deals with trademarks, appellations of origin, and industrial designs, which fall under
Ministry of Internal Trade and Supply. Book three covers copyrights and neighboring rights and is under the
purview of the Ministry of Culture and Communications as well as the Ministry of Information Technology.
Finally, book four focuses on plant varieties and is applied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land
Reclamation. UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF THE EGYPT'S IPR LAw, PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL JOURNAL
ISSUE, No. 22 BIS- Dated 2nd of June 2002 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Law No. 82 of 2002].
82. Egyptian Patent Law No. 82 of 1949, http://www.reldekki.com/lib02.html (last visited Oct. 7,
2003).
83. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Still Under Scrutiny, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, June 1, 2000,
at 3.
84. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Aug.
1, 1998, at 2.
85. An executive regulation in the Egyptian legal context is equivalent to an administrative
regulation formulated by an administrative agency.
86. Niveen Wahish, IPR: The Mother of Invention?, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, June 21-27,
2001, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
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regulations were still being negotiated at the time of the writing of this Note,87
the issues discussed here are based on the various ways that the text of the law
may be interpreted and the consequences of such interpretations. It is worth
mentioning that Egypt has decided to take advantage of the ten-year transition
period offered to developing countries under TRIPS, which postpones full
implementation of a TRIPS compliant law until January 1, 2005 but requires
compliance with the mailbox, exclusive marketing rights, and undisclosed
information provisions as of January 2000.88
1. Compulsory Licensing
TRIPS Article 31 allows member countries to grant compulsory licenses
in limited circumstances. A compulsory license is an annulment of patent rights
by a judicial or governmental authority, causing a temporary deprivation of a
patentee's monopoly over the original subject matter. Therefore, recipients of
compulsory licenses may make, use, and sell the otherwise patented subject
matter before the expiration period of the compulsory license.89 Because the
language of Article 31 does not specify or place clear restrictions on the
purposes for granting compulsory licenses 9° and a compulsory license may
reduce the market price of a medicine by 75 percent,9' the issue has become
very controversial.92 In general, developed nations, including the United States,
want to limit this remedy to violations of competition laws or national
emergencies whereas developing nations want to include public health and
economic crisis as legitimate justifications for granting compulsory licenses.93
Developed nations also prefer to apply closely textual interpretations to Article
87. Mostafa, supra note 7.
88. The decision to take advantage of the additional five-year grace period was hotly debated in the
Egyptian Parliament beginning in 1999. Nermien At-Ali, The Egyptian Pharmaceutical Industry After TRIPS
-A Practitioner's View, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 274, 295-96 (2003); Emily Downes, New Industries Demand
Improved Protection, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Issue 97, at 39 (Mar. 2000).
89. Nerozzi, supra note 17, at 612.
90. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31 ("in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency"); Champ & Attaran, supra note 61, at 366.
91. Naomi B. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement For Developing Countries:
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
191, 200 (2002).
92. Id. at 198-201.
93. See Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Under The TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and
Patents, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 941, 950-54 (2000) (describing South Africa's experience with the AIDS
crisis and its subsequent issuance of compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drug therapies); see also David P.
Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in The Developing World, 7 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 209-11 (1999) (describing the ensuing political conflict after South Africa and
Thailand permitted compulsory licensing for patented HIV/AIDS drugs).
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31 (b) regarding.the working of a patent with respect to compulsory licensing.94
They support the view that as long as the patent is worked in any one of the
WTO member nations there is no grounds for invoking Article 31 (b) as a basis
for compulsory licensing, placing this approach in direct opposition to
developing nations' local production requirements.95
Article 23 of Egypt's Law 82 of 2002 exercises a broad interpretation of
TRIPS Article 31. The basis for granting compulsory licenses without the need
for prior negotiation with the patentee include non-commercial public uses
necessary to preserve "national security, health, food, and environmental safety"
and "confronting cases of emergencies and extreme urgent circumstances,"
which is more or less TRIPS compliant. However, the provision permitting
compulsory licensing "to support the national effort in a significant sector for
economic, social and technological development, without unreasonable pre-
judice to the patentee rights"96 expands TRIPS' "national emergency and other
circumstances of extreme urgency"97 to include economic, social (i.e. public
health), and technological issues. Such language may be setting the stage for
broad public health exceptions to patent-holders' rights similar to those invoked
by Brazil or South Africa with respect to AIDS/HIV medicines. 98
Egypt's working standards for a patent are narrowly construed. "If the
patentee did not exploit the patent in Egypt directly or under his/her authoriza-
tion the exploitation was not sufficient following four years from the date of
filing the patent application or three years from the grant date whichever is
longer[,]" 99 then a compulsory license will be issued. If the patentee ceases to
exploit the patent without an acceptable reason for over a year, a compulsory
license will be issued. Egypt's law defines exploitation as "the manufacturing
of the product subject matter of production in Egypt, or using the manufacturing
process subject matter of the protected patent invention"" and excludes
94. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31(b) ("if... the proposed user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have
not been successful within a reasonable period of time").
95. WATAL, supra note 19, at 316-17 (citing art. 68(I) of Brazilian Patent Law, art. 43 of Argentine
Law). Note also that New Zealand issues compulsory licenses if there is a failure to supply the market on
reasonable terms and Germany issues them if there is no other substitute for the treatment of a disease. Id.
96. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. 1(3).
97. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 31.
98. See generally Bass, supra note 91, at 206-23 (describing in detail the controversy over
compulsory licensing for HIV/AIDS in Brazil and South Africa); see also Jose Marcos Nogueira Viana,
Intellectual Property Rights, The World Trade Organization And Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective,
17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311 (2002) (justifying Brazil's use of compulsory licensing toward HIV/AIDS drugs for
security and public health interests).
99. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. IV.
100. Id. at art. 23, sec. IV.
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importation."' This language is likely to invite protest from MNEs who do not
want to perform foreign direct investment in a nation, but do want to preserve
their patents and import their goods.
A final justification for issuing compulsory licensing under Law 82 is "the
lack of supply of patented drugs to satisfy the country's needs, or because the
decline in its quality, or irregular incline of its price, or in the event that the
invention drug is related to critical cases or chronic or endemic or epidemic
diseases .... ."'02 Although the patent holder has the right to immediate notifica-
tion in this instance,"0 3 the government will possess a significant degree of
leeway that will impede her freedom to make market-based decisions in pricing
or sales. Egypt may have decided to use the aforementioned language in order
to avoid falling victim to global reference pricing. Many governments in
developed nations, including the United States, base their price controls on
pharmaceuticals on a global reference price that averages in the price of a drug
in the various countries it is sold. Therefore, if a price in a particular country
(or countries) is so low that it will decrease the global reference price, then the
pharmaceutical company may either raise the price to the levels found in
developed countries or withdraw from the market altogether in order to preserve
its primary profit base in developed countries. " Either option may prove to be
catastrophic to the developing nation's public health.
2. Compensation for Compulsory Licensing
An intimately related issue to compulsory licenses is the determination of
compensation owed to the patent holder in return for monetary losses incurred.
TRIPS Article 31(h) states that, "the right holder shall be paid adequate
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the econo-
mic value of the authorization" (emphasis added). Egypt's law states, "[t]he
patentee is entitled to a fair compensation against the exploitation of the inven-
tion. The economic value of the invention must be considered while determin-
ing said compensation" (emphasis added). 5 The difference in text has sparked
the debate of how to determine the compensation.
Pharmaceutical companies from developed countries want to be placed in
the same position monetarily as they would have been had the compulsory
license not been issued. This translates into the full market value of the license,
101. THE WORLDTRADEORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FORTRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OFINTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Review of Legislation, Nov. 14, 2001, EP/C/278/Add.2 (responding to a question posed
by Switzerland to the Permanent Mission of Egypt).
102. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 23, sec. H.
103. Id.
104. Lanjouw, supra note 20, at Ii.
105. Law 82 of 2002, supra note 8 1, at art. 24(8).
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incorporating the costs of development and lost profits." 6 Factors they believe
should be considered include: the risks and costs associated with the invention
claimed in the patent and the commercial development of products that use the
invention, the efficacy and innovative nature and importance to the public health
of the invention or products using the invention, the degree to which the inven-
tion benefited from publicly funded research, the need for adequate incentives
for the creation and commercialization of new inventions, the interests of the
public as patients and payers of health care services, and the public health
benefits of expanded access to the invention. °7
The Egyptian government, on the other hand, may decide to limit the
remuneration to the profits earned from the temporary use by the compulsory
license recipient."' Or it may refuse any compensation to a pharmaceutical
company with no plans to invest in the domestic market, claming it has suffered
no loss and hence is not entitled to compensation. "9 These diverging interpreta-
tions have unsurprisingly initiated significant controversy within the ongoing
executive regulation negotiation process.
3. Parallel Imports (Gray Markets)
TRIPS Article 6 purposely punts the issue of exhaustion by stating,
"nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion
of intellectual property rights."' o Exhaustion limits the rights of a patent holder
in controlling the importing, exporting, and distribution of the patented item."'
A national exhaustion scheme gives the patent holder control over importing,
exporting, and distribution of the patented item so long as the patent holder has
not released the patented item into the market. But as soon as the patent holder
releases the item into that nation's market, then it is considered fully exhausted
and the patent holder no longer has that type of control, allowing anyone to
import or export the item." 2 On the other hand, if a country chooses interna-
tional exhaustion the patent holder loses control of distribution once he or she
puts the item into the market anywhere in the world." 3
106. Susan v. Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical TRIPS: What Standard of
Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT'L&COMP. L REV. 87, 105 (2001).
107. H.R. 1708 Sec 2(a)(d), 107th Congress (2003), available at www.thomas.loc.gov (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
108. Vaughan, supra note 106, at 105.
109. Id. at 108-09.
110. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 6.
111. Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets As a Limit On Patent
Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 217, 251 (2002) (also known in US law as the first sale doctrine).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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In Egypt's case, Article 10 states that the patentee's right in excluding
others from importing, exporting, using, selling, or distributing the product
"shall be exhausted if the patentee marketed or licensed said product to third
party/others." It does not specify the applicable jurisdiction for marketing and
licensing activities, nationally or internationally. However, the Permanent
Mission of Egypt in the WTO replied to a question pertaining to exhaustion
posed by the United States with, "[t]he patent rights are 'exhausted' if the patent
owner has marketed the invention (i.e. actually put the protected product on the
market for circulation in the normal channels of commerce) anywhere in the
world"' 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, once a party legally obtains the patented
item from the patentee, anywhere in the world, it may argue that it is free to
export or import it to whomever it chooses. From the patentee's perspective this
is problematic because she may sell it to an authorized purchaser who then sells
it to a third party who then engages in parallel exporting to another country with
similar or weaker laws.
This process of re-exporting to another country creates gray markets. Gray
markets are the unauthorized distribution of a good or service. They are created
when a business imports a good for a low price (due to its nation's lower GDP
per capita) from the patent holder and subsequently exports it to another country
to be sold for a price higher than the business purchased it for but lower than the
price offered by the patent holder. Consequently, the gray market goods com-
pete with the patent holder's goods and compromise her profit margins in the
higher priced market. 5 This specific situation is unlikely to occur in the United
States because US patent law protects patent holders from parallel imports,
allowing them to sue the US importer." 6 However, if the exchange takes place
between Egypt, applying an international exhaustion approach, and another
country with weak IPR laws, then the US company would have no power to
prevent this exchange." 7
As a consequence, the pharmaceutical may raise the price of the drug in
Egypt, in order to thwart any profitability from parallel trading. Hence,
Egyptian consumers will bear the burden for the lower prices obtained in the
importing nation. The patent holder will no longer engage in price discrimina-
tion among poor and rich nations, which will price out poor consumers." 8
114. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, COUNCIL FOR TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OFINTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, Review of Legislation, Nov. 14, 2001, IP/C/278/Add.2 (referring specifically to an
interpretation of art. II of Law No. 82 of 2002).
115. Ghosh, supra note 111, at 218; WATAL, supra note 19, at 297. For example, an Egyptian
company legally imports or locally purchases a drug from a United States company for $6 in order to export
it back to the United States for $10 when that same drug is sold by the United States company at $15.
116. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 20.
117. Ghosh, supra note 111, at 253.
118. Sykes, supra note 17, at 63-64.
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Egypt may then react to the price increase by issuing a compulsory license
based on Law 82 of 2002 Article 23 Section Two's "irregular incline in its
price" justification. And if the patent holder responds by refusing to sell or pro-
duce the drug in Egypt, then Article 23 Section Four's provision for failing to
exploit the patent domestically may also initiate a compulsory license. The
patent holder is thus placed in a quandary when it comes to protecting her
profits with respect to gray markets.119
4. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
TRIPS addresses wealthy nations' specific concerns with IPR enforcement
deficiencies in developing nations' domestic laws. For example, TRIPS com-
pliant laws should address the inability to obtain evidence to prove infringe-
ment, indeterminable delays in bringing a case to trial and getting a final judg-
ment, the inability to get preliminary injunctions, inadequate damage awards
and criminal sanctions, and the lack of enforcement at the borders to prevent
importation of infringing goods. E° Consequently, TRIPS Article 41 requires
that enforcement include "expeditious remedies to prevent infringement and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringement [and] ... proce-
dures.., shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreason-
able time limits or unwarranted delay." Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 address fair
and equitable procedures, evidence, injunctions, and damages respectively.
With respect to damages, Article 181 of Law 82 of 2002 may fail to meet
the TRIPS requirements. Article 32 of Law 82 of 2002 imposes a fine of 20,000
to 100,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $3700 to $18,000)121 for first time
offenders. Recidivism is penalized with imprisonment of no less than three
months and a fine of 40,000 to 200,000 Egyptian pounds.12 2 Western commen-
tators believe this is an insufficient deterrence considering the high profits
gained from patent drug infringement.
However, the new law does include new provisions that provide for tem-
porary injunctions against the violator until the case goes to court. 23 Equitable
procedures are also available to patentees since they may ask the judge to "order
conservative procedures concerning the products and goods subject matter of
119. It is worth mentioning that gray markets create quality control issues. The US company may
be legally selling a lower quality version of the drug to Egypt in order to compensate for the lower prices. But
if this product is then re-exported to a higher priced market that is receiving a higher quality version of that
good, then consumer deception and potential litigation may ensue. Ghosh, supra note 11l, at 220; WATAL,
supra note 19, at 297.
120. WATAL, supra note 19, at 333.
121. See THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Report on Business: Money and Markets Foreign Exchange, Feb.
24, 2003, at BlO (citing the currency exchange rate on February 23, 2003 of 5.5 Egyptian pounds per US$1).
122. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 32.
123. Id.; Mostafa, supra note 7.
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the claim [in order to] . . . preserve the condition of such goods and pro-
ducts ... ,,24 and to "order appropriate conservative procedures to fulfill ren-
dered fines or compensation in addition to ordering the destruction of confis-
cated subject matter. .,,12 Finally, non-disclosure agreements are now subject
to Egyptian law and enforceable in Egyptian courts, which saves foreign com-
panies the time and resources of going abroad to enforce their rights.
126
Despite the legal improvements in the law, there remain institutional and
financial obstacles to efficient enforcement. For example, the Patent Office is
not automated, there is a shortage of trained patent examiners (those available
are poorly trained), and there are not enough judges to handle all of the cases
and appeals. 27 Overcoming these limitations is an expensive feat. In 1996, an
Egyptian spokesman to the United Nations estimated a cost of $98,000 to
increase patent personnel and purchase necessary equipment, $192,000 to pre-
pare the judiciary for patent enforcement, and $1,000,000 to train and develop
customs authorities.128 For a developing country with a pre-existing budgetary
crisis, 129 these expenses serve as formidable impediments to effective enforce-
ment of the new IPR law.
The Patent Office also lacks the necessary communication link with the
Ministry of Health to ensure that health regulatory authorities do not provide
marketing authorization for unauthorized copies of products subject to patent
protection. 3' Foreign pharmaceuticals are particularly concerned with the
Ministry of Health's interference with the patenting process.' 3' Under the old
law, the Ministry of Health participated in patent application processing in
collaboration with the Patent Office. 32 The new law's text grants the Patent
Office sole jurisdiction over patent applications,"' with some exceptions. If the
invention "possess[es] health value"' 34 then the Ministry of Health may oppose
124. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 33.
125. Id. at art. 35.
126. Id. at arts. 42, 63; Mostafa, supra note 7.
127. Downes, supra note 88, at 4; see also INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE,
2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT EGYPT 94 (2003) (citing the lack of transparency, the snail's pace adjudication
process, and the lack of training as major obstacles to intellectual property rights enforcement), at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2003/2003SPEC30lEGYPT.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
128. Al-Ali, supra note 88, at 283.
129. In The Shadow ofIraq, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST, Aug. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WL
7406212 (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
130. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, PhRMA Special 301 Submission
Priority Watch List Countries: Middle East, Africa, South Asia 64, www.phrna.org/intemational/resources/
2002-02-22.45.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter PhRMA].
131. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Failing Grades, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Jan. 1, 2001, at 1.
132. Wahish, supra note 86.
133. Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 16.
134. Id. at art. 17.
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the granting of a patent. This will inevitably involve the Ministry in reviewing
patents albeit for a limited purpose. The Ministry of Health also decides on a
case-by-case basis if the patent should be subject to a compulsory license.135
But most importantly, the Ministry of Health controls the drug registration
process and price-control system (discussed in detail in Subsection II (C)),
which impacts a drug manufacturer's profits as much as her patent rights. This
important separation of authority necessary to avoid inconsistent treatment
among patent holders is likely being addressed in the executive regulations
currently under negotiation.
IV. THE EGYPTIAN CONTEXT IN WHICH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS EXIST
A. The Political Debate on Intellectual Property Rights
Unsurprisingly, passage of the new IPR law in Egypt did not occur in the
absence of public controversy and opposition. The Egyptian government faced
significant political pressure from public sector generic pharmaceutical manu-
facturers. They launched a major lobbying campaign against the new law in
order protect their generic drug production.'36 This powerful opposition group
obtained public support by claiming that intellectual property rights would raise
the price of medicine, cause unemployment, and force the local factories to shut
down. 137 Pharmacists also believed that new therapies would take years to
become available to most Egyptians due to the increase in prices.'38 Such
allegations are particularly sensitive in a country where 23% to 35% of house-
holds live below the official poverty line. 39 Even a former Minister of Health
was staunchly against patent protection, claiming it was an unnecessary evil and
would result in foreign dominance of a key national sector and higher prices for
the poor. 4 '
Despite such strong opposition, the law managed to pass due to a variety
of factors. First, the number of patent applications by local parties doubled
from 1995 to 2000 due to improvements in the economy. This surge in applica-
tions indicated an increase in innovation of intellectual property as well as a
135. Id. at art. 23.
136. Susan Postlewaite, Egypt Changes the Way It Does Drugs, IP WORLDWIDE, Aug. 2002, at 16.
137. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, No Protection, No Investment, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Aug.
1, 1998, at 2.
138. Hadia Mostafa, A Tough Pill to Swallow, BUSINESS TODAY EGYPT, Aug. 2002, available at
http://www.businesstodayegypt.comlissuesl0208/4D57/02084D57.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) (discuss
predictions of price increases).
139. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 137.
140. Id.; Downes, supra note 88; Mostafa, supra note 7.
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subsequent desire for protection. 4' Second, foreign investors, in particular the
members of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), informed Egypt that its weak IPR regime deterred them from invest-
ing $300 million in Egypt's pharmaceutical sector. 4 A number of reform-
minded legislators in the Parliament took such missed opportunities seriously
and managed to get the law through. 4 3 Third, a new Minister of Health, who
is a respected academic, was recently appointed. His appreciation for the need
to attract foreign investment by strengthening pharmaceutical patent protection
played a key role in convincing the public of the benefits of the new law.'
Finally, Egypt feared that Jordan's recent passage of a new IPR law would
divert potential investment and deny Egypt the opportunity of becoming a
regional pharmaceutical manufacturing center. 45
In order to fully appreciate the impact of this new law on Egypt's econo-
mic growth prospects, as well as the reason why the new law is so controversial,
one must understand the highly concentrated market structure of Egypt's
pharmaceutical industry and its deficient health care system.
B. The Local Pharmaceutical Industry and Health Care Insurance
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the oldest strategic industries in
Egypt and the largest producer of pharmaceuticals in the Middle East and North
Africa region. Established in 1939, the sector underwent significant growth in
the 1980s as new pharmaceutical factories began locally manufacturing pharma-
ceutical products for local consumption as well as export to the Arab and
African markets.'46 The sector is composed of eight public production com-
panies, three public support services companies (importing, distributing, and
packaging), and twenty-two private production companies. It is highly concen-
trated with the top nine (foreign) companies controlling 45% of the market and
the top five of those controlling 32% of the market.1 47 Egypt exports 6% of its
production of which 74.9% is exported to the Middle East and North Africa
region.148
141. Downes, supra note 88.
142. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Egypt: Patent Pending, BUSINESS MIDDLE EAST, Jan. 16,
2001, at 1. Note that with stronger IPR laws, PhRMA members would also reclaim their annual losses of $100
million from patent infringements in Egypt and increase their market share from 18% to 25%. ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 131, at 2.
143. Mostafa, supra note 7.
144. Mostafa, supra note 138.
145. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 142.
146. AmCham, supra note 9, at 3.
147. Id. at 24-27.
148. Id. at 15.
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Public sector companies control 17.6% of local production and export 63%
of the nation's total pharmaceutical exports.149 Public sector firms have been
losing market share to the private sector, primarily foreign firms, due to ineffi-
cient distribution channels, high operating costs, heavy governmental control
and restrictions on expenditures, highly restricted R&D expenditures of 1%-2%,
weak marketing and sales efforts, overstaffing, and sale of drugs below cost for
socio-economic reasons.' The consequent loss of revenues has placed more
pressure on them to export. Moreover, since at least 200 drugs are currently
produced by Egyptian drug companies (private and public) without the payment
of royalties to the multinational pharmaceutical companies that discovered the
drugs through their own research and development,'' public sector firms have
reason to fear further erosion of market share upon implementation of the new
IPR law.
Although the public firms' concern with elimination from the market is
legitimate, it may be misdirected. The real threat to their success may not be as
simple as the presence of stronger IPRs, but their sub-standard managerial,
packaging, advertising, and quality control standards. To some extent, they will
lose their sources of revenue from on-patent generic drugs. But fully relying on
patent infringements for revenue is not sustainable in the long run. As the costs
of operations increase, due to their inefficient business structure, any potential
profits gained from producing a lower-cost, generic drug will be undermined.
If the government absorbs the losses in order to keep the prices of drugs low, the
public will ultimately suffer in other ways as the country's overall budget deficit
increases. Hence, a false sense of security regarding the affordability of medi-
cine is created among the population. Yes, the price of drugs is currently
affordable but perhaps at the expense of a higher quality health care system or
an adequate physical infrastructure.
But price does matter. Only 59% of Egyptians are covered by health
insurance of which 4% are covered by private health insurance and 55% by sub-
standard public health insurance.'52 The public health insurance scheme entitles
the recipient to a doctor and a hospital bed, but the quality of the services is so
low that most resort to private services paid at their own expense. 153 That brings
the number of people that pay for medicines straight from their pockets to 98%,
which resulted in a low per capita consumption of LE57.81 (approximately
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Mohamed RaoufHamed, To Make the Medicine Go Down, AL-AHRAm WEEKLY ON-LINE, May
24-30, 2001; Ahmed Fekry, Drug Manufacturers Warn of Bankruptcies, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Feb. 24,2002,
http://www.metimes.com/2k3Assue2003-39/methaus.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
152. Id. at 21.
153. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, Life at the Bottom, MIDDLE EAST BUSINESS, Vol. 350, Issue
8111, at 10.
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$16.76) in 1998.154 These low consumption levels exist notwithstanding that the
price of drugs are as low as $1-$2 per package, which are among the lowest
prices in the world.155 Given Egypt's low GDP per capita of $1,490 156 and that
49.6% of the 70 million Egyptians live below the upper poverty line,'5 7 any
increase in price may decrease consumption levels to unacceptable lows
particularly with respect to diabetes, renal and heart diseases, and cancer. Add
to that the recent elimination of food subsidies and the increasing cost of
living. 5 8 These factors combined impose a heavy burden on consumers as they
struggle to meet their most basic needs. Due to the country's inadequate
political transparency and notorious record of government corruption, con-
sumers may nonetheless choose to have the lower priced drugs because they do
not believe that the savings gained from addressing the macroeconomic ineffi-
ciencies will be passed onto them in other forms.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian government decided in 1995 that privatization
and reform of public sector pharmaceutical companies was an integral part of
reforming the overall economy. 15  Therefore, even in the absence of IPRs,
public sector pharmaceutical companies will have to reform their internal
management systems, obtain the marketing and sales skills to prepare them to
compete in the global market, and invest more money into R&D." ° They will
have to improve their quality assurance tests to meet international quality
standards if they want to continue exporting their products abroad.' 6'
If these weaknesses are properly addressed, then the addition of strong
IPRs may indeed prove beneficial to local firms. For example, public sector
companies import most of their active ingredients, machinery, spare parts, and
equipment. The cost of these inputs will decrease in the presence of strong
IPRs. Foreign pharmaceutical patent holders will no longer be forced to
increase the price of inputs as a means of recouping lost profits from finished
drugs. 162 The public sector also focuses on export markets, which is unlikely to
exist in MNEs with strict orders from headquarters to limit service to the
domestic market. 163 If public pharmaceuticals do invest in R&D and patent new
products, these exports may become a significant source of profits and a vital
154. Amcham, supra note 9, at 24 (comparing this to $34.10 in Kuwait and $35.40 in Qatar the same
year).
155. Postlewaite, supra note 136.
156. THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 18 tbl. 1.1.
157. Al-Ali, supra note 88, at 307.
158. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 153.
159. Amcham, supra note 9, at 8.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 6.
163. Id. at 8.
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source of foreign currency for Egypt - assuming the profits are reinvested into
the Egyptian economy.
Ten of the twenty-two private sector pharmaceutical producers are
domestic firms. These firms control 8.9% of total private sector sales. They too
import a large percentage of their primary elements, 80%-85%, in order to pro-
duce end-use products for final consumption.' 64 They export these drugs free
of margin ceiling limitations that are imposed on locally sold products.
165
Because most of their production is over the counter and generic drug (of on-
patent drugs), the new law will appreciably impact their operations. They will
be forced to innovate their own formulas and patent them, sign licensing
agreements with foreign pharmaceuticals to produce their patented drugs
domestically, or simply go out of business.
If the first scenario is too occur, these firms will need the research and
development training and financing necessary to engage in drug innovation.
How and whether this will occur will likely depend on the government's will-
ingness to directly fund their R&D endeavors, form public-private R&D
partnerships, and reform the price control system. 166 If the predominant effect
is the proliferation of licensing agreements, then actual technology transfer will
need to take place in order to produce the desired increase in productive
capacity within the local pharmaceutical industry. 167 And if the least desired
result of bankruptcy occurs, then the Egyptian government will most certainly
face a major political crisis.
C. Regulatory Obstacles to Efficiency
With respect to drug regulation, TRIPS' guidelines are limited to the prin-
ciples of non-discrimination and most favored nation treatment. 168 Each indivi-
dual nation, "in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, [is free to]
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development... ,,169 Therefore, price controls, drug registration
and approval, and import-export regulations are left to the discretion of the
individual WTO members, "provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions [of TRIPS]."' 70
164. Amcham, supra note 9, at 6-8.
165. Id. at 6.
166. Aziza Saimi, A Bleak Prognosis, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, May 31-June 6, 2001, at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/536/ecl.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003); see infra subpart HIl(C) for detailed
discussion of Egypt's price controls.
167. See generally infra subpart IV(B) (providing a detailed discussion of technology transfer).
168. TRIPS, supra note 19, at arts. 3, 4.
169. Id. at art. 8.
170. Id.
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The Egyptian pharmaceutical industry exists within a complicated regula-
tory environment. The government exercises strict control over the types of
drugs that can be imported into the country, which often results in the banning
of some finished drugs. 7 ' Importers must obtain an import license to bring in
a specified quantity of a drug at a specified price. Imported raw materials are
subject to a 5% customs duty and a 1% sales tax unless they are to be used for
the production of an essential drug thereby subjecting them to a 1% customs tax
and no sales tax.'72
New finished drugs must be registered. Under the old law, registration
took up to three years after submitting all the relevant research documentation
to the Ministry of Health.'73 However, foreign firms were more susceptible to
persevering through this process because local firns simply submitted a docu-
ment showing a slight variation in the manufacturing process of an existing
drug, gave the drug a new name, and received approval much quicker.'74
Whether this phenomena is a form of discriminatory treatment between foreign
and domestic firms is debatable since there is a substantive difference between
registering an entirely new drug and registering a slight variation of an existing
registered drug. Nonetheless, this issue should be resolvable under the new IPR
law's non-discrimination provision.' The more pressing issue lies in the
registration process itself. If Egypt is serious about attracting foreign direct
investment and assisting its own private sector's profitability, the registration
process must be reformed to decrease the amount of time taken to bring a new
finished product to the market, whether by a foreign or local party.
Egypt also sets price controls on pharmaceuticals, which is a legitimate
practice under TRIPS.'76 The Pharmaceutical Pricing Committee at the Drug
Planning and Policy Center sets prices with the aim to keep medicine affordable
to the majority of the population. Because the process revolves more around
social concems, the pharmaceutical's profitability objectives are overlooked.
The prices do not adequately reflect the fair market value with respect to R&D
costs, promotion spending, inflation, currency devaluation, 177 and the changes
in costs of raw materials. In 1996, the Govemment of Egypt (GOE) made some
reforms to the price-setting system by adopting a cost-plus formula that allowed
171. PhRMA, supra note 130, at 64; ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 84.
172. AmCham, supra note 9, at 10.
173. Postlewaite, supra note 136.
174. Id.
175. See Law No. 82 of 2002, supra note 81, at art. 4 ("Every natural or legal person whether or
Egyptian or foreign nationals... are entitled to the rights of applying for patent at the Egyptian Patent Office
and enjoy all rights granted by this law.").
176. Lanjouw, supra note 15, at 22.
177. See PhRMA, supra note 130, at 65 (citing major reductions in profitability in the sector due to
the recent 60% devaluation of the Egyptian pound).
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for a fixed profit margin above the cost of ingredients, but it continued to
exclude the other variables that contribute to production costs.
7 8
The adverse effect of this price-setting scheme is a reduction in R&D by
foreign and domestic firms because they cannot recoup those costs through
sales. 179 The limited potential profits deter prospective manufacturers of patent-
able pharmaceuticals from setting up shop in the country and stifle the
importing of new products.' 8 Additionally, monitoring and enforcement of
these price controls is costly as it adds more bureaucracy to an already strained
business environment. 181 Because allowing the market to completely control
prices may result in inaccessibility to medicine by a significant portion of the
population, one scholar suggests a selective use of price control for the products
with few affordable therapeutic alternatives. Therefore, the price-controlled
segment will be too small to jeopardize the introduction and availability of
newer, more effective pharmaceuticals into the market.8 2 Ultimately, if the
GOE wishes to fully exploit the benefit of the new IPR law, it will have to
address this important issue through dialogue and cooperation with the private
sector.
V. STRONGER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS Is NOT ENOUGH
A. Strengthening Research and Development Capabilities
Although the aforementioned description of Egypt's IPR reforms appears
to represent a significant step towards "reduc[ing] distortions and impediments
to international trade[,]' 18 3 it is insufficient to bring about the expected benefits
to both the Egyptian private sector and the Egyptian consumer. The IPR regime
must be complemented and linked with other legal regimes dealing with
research and development, technology transfer and competition policy. One
cannot disregard that the developed nations' reasoning in support of IPRs' is
based on the pivotal assumption that domestic pharmaceuticals in developing
nations, public or private, have the technical as well as financial resources to
conduct adequate research and development activities. However, this is rarely
the case, and Egypt is no exception. The domestic sector's technical capability
is limited to the production of therapeutic ingredients and finished goods and
178. AmCham, supra note 9, at 9.
179. Id.
180. WATAL, supra note 19, at 742.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. TRIPS, supra note 19, at Preamble.
184. See infra subpart I(A) (providing detailed discussion of developing countries' concerns
regarding strengthening intellectual property regimes).
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lacks a sophisticated research and development base.1 85  Pharmaceuticals
operating in Egypt allocate less than 2% of their revenues to research and
development activities, due in part to the defective price setting structure.
186
Local pharmaceuticals depend on imports for 85% of their raw materials,
making their costs heavily based on external economic factors.'87 Moreover,
Egyptian higher education, the main component in creating the necessary
human resources, is in urgent need of reform and upgrading. 8 8 In 1987, there
were only 3,782 Egyptian research scientists per million inhabitants compared
to 466,211 in the United States or 29,509 in India.
1 89
These debilitating factors will not miraculously be resolved by mere IPR
regime reforms. Although stronger IPR legal regimes will create financial
incentives and legal certainty for current and new entrants into the market, that
is not enough to produce the objectives of economic growth and improved
public welfare sought by developing nations. A robust system of national and
international linkages among practitioners needs to be established. Egypt
should also tap into the ongoing transformation of industrial firms in wealthy
nations. As these firms transition from vertically integrated firms to outsourcing
and subcontracting to individuals and businesses in the developing world,
Egyptian businesses can utilize the new IPR law to earn the trust of MNEs
concerned with their trade secrets and patented products.' 90
Technology policies that link Egyptian scientists and practitioners with
each other as well as with their foreign counterparts should be adopted. 9' For
example, the GOE should focus on creating incentives for cooperation between
research and development institutions, universities, and industry. Favorable tax
treatment and economic rewards, an obvious one being the monopoly power
created by patent, should be granted to local entrepreneurs.' 92 The policies'
incentive structures should also attract financing for research and development
activities. Egypt can learn from the United States' experience by providing
public funding for R&D activities through direct sponsorship. 93
185. Omer, supra note 8, at 551 n. 4.
186. AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
187. Id. at 21.
188. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, ARAB HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 65 (2002),
www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/chapter5.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Arab Human Development
Report].
189. Id. at 67.
190. See id. (noting that Asia and Latin American subcontractors greatly benefited from this process).
191. See id. at 66 (noting the establishment of linkages and policies in Brazil, China, and the Republic
of Korea as a means of strengthening their national knowledge base).
192. Id. at 70.
193. Id. at 71 ("more than 45% of all R&D efforts in the United States over the last 20 years have
been funded directly by government agencies").
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To the GOE's credit, new polices have recently been passed to support
information technology. National plans include promoting infrastructure,
encouraging foreign and local investment, providing Internet services to
schools, and establishing a free zone for information and communication tech-
nology (known as Smart Village).' 4 Similar approaches and attitudes are
required with respect to the needs of the technology intensive and science based
pharmaceutical industry.
B. Encouraging Effective Technology Transfer and Preventing Anti-Compet-
itive Practices
As subparts I (A) and (B) of this Note mention, a primary incentive for
developing countries to reform their IPR regimes is to encourage technology
transfer.' 95 More specifically, nations want an effective transfer of skills and
intangible know-how that will lead to an increase in production capabilities by
local market participants. 96 TRIPS Article 7 states "protection and enforcement
of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technologi-
cal innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology... in a
manner conducive to social and economic welfare" and Article 8 states that
"[aippropriate measures [consistent with other provisions] ... may be needed
to prevent the... adverse affect [to] the international transfer of technology."
In addition, a WTO Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology (of
which Egypt is a member) was created to "examine and recommend measures
that might be taken to increase flow of technology to developing
countries . '. ."'9' Therefore, signatories are encouraged to adopt policies that
will encourage the transfer of technology along with the strengthening of IPRs.
In Egypt's case, technology transfer in the form of foreign direct invest-
ment continues to lag behind expectations. The decrease in foreign direct
investment inflows illustrates that the nation is still in the unavoidably lengthy
process of transforming these legal incentives into tangible results. 98
Consequently, Egypt passed a new Commercial Code Law No. 17 of 1999,
194. Id. at 71, 77; Cam McGrath, Communication - Egypt: Silicon Oasis Rises in the Desert, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jul. 16, 2002.
195. WATAL, supra note 19, at 386.
196. Omer, supra note 8, at 56 1.
197. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY, WT/WGTI r/W/2, (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter WTO WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY].
198. See Maskus, supra note 5, at 153 (showing Egypt's decreasing FDI inflows at $948 million in
1987, $734 million in 1990, and $598 million in 1995); British Direct Investments in Egypt at $26 Mln Q1
FY2002, EGYPTIAN NEWS DIGEST, Feb. 7, 2002, at 2003 WL 3950525 (stating that Egypt attracted $428.2
million in foreign direct investment in 2001-2002 down from $509.4 million in 2000-2001).
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which included provisions specifically addressing technology transfer.'99 The
provisions permitted the invalidation of any restriction on "the freedom of the
importer of technology... in its use, development, acquaintance of the product
or its advertisement ''2°° placed in a technology transfer contract. Examples of
invalid contract restrictions include:
1) Prohibiting the improvement or modification to the imported
technology to suit local conditions;
2) The prohibition of acquiring similar technology or competing
technology;
3) Limitations on production volume, price, method of distribu-
tion, and export;
4) Required interference of the supplier in the importers business
operations;
5) Exclusive supply arrangements for raw materials, equipment,
machines, or spare parts from the supplier alone; and
6) Restrictions on the sale of the production.2"'
The supplier also has to supply the importer with information, data, and
technical documents needed to assimilate the technology into the local market
and provide the importer with technical services for the operation of the tech-
nology. Finally, the supplier has the obligation of providing the importer with
spare parts for machines and equipment supplied, if she produces them, or
advise the importer on other sources.2 2 This is particularly relevant to Egypt
because the majority of capital equipment and machinery used in production is
imported.
20 3
These complementary laws, however, may simply gather dust given the
competitive realities in the global market. Foreign firms are loathe to reveal any
trade secrets or technical information that may easily be imitated and compete
with their products. Therefore, the legal certainty brought about by IPRs, which
encourage information dissemination by guaranteeing patentees legal remedies
for infringement, will give technology transfer polices vitality. 2°4 Because
199. Tarek F. Riad, Egypt: Technology Transfer Provisions in Law No. 17 of 1999, ARAB LAW
QUARTERLY, 418-22 (2000) (publishing Commercial Code Law No. 17 of 1999, Articles 72-87 in their
entirety).
200. Tarek F. Riad, The Legal Environment For Investment In Egypt In The New Millennium, ARAB
LAW QUARTERLY 117, 120 (2000).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 121.
203. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 48, at 212 tbl. 4.3, 223 tbl. 4.6 (citing Egypt's manufacturing
of machinery and transport equipment as 15% of total manufacturing in 1999 and Egypt's manufactured
imports, which include capital equipment, as 77% of total imports in 2000).
204. Omer, supra note 8, at 558.
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pharmaceutical production does not entail complex technologies or highly
differentiated goods, foreign pharmaceuticals will find it more attractive to
import their products via licensing agreements rather then set up shop in a
developing country with complicated bureaucratic red tape, a costly and time
consuming drug registration system, and an unfamiliar legal regime."°5
On the other hand, the presence of stronger IPRs may increase the costs of
acquiring and diffusing technology if suppliers can negotiate higher license fees
and royalties due to their monopoly power.20 6 "Cartel-like restraints, exclu-
sionary conduct and monopoly leveraging by dominant firms, practices, or
mergers may chill technological innovation""2 7 as well as technology transfer.
Taking into consideration these competition risks, Egypt's technology transfer
law appears to also serve as a competition policy." 8 The second and fifth
invalid contract restrictions previously mentioned address the risks associated
with vertical licensing agreements. Although vertical-licensing agreements may
ensure downstream product quality, they may also erode competition, as they
become tie-in sales of unrelated products of technology that extend the scope
of patent protection.0 9 The third invalid contract restriction addresses the risks
of fixed pricing, limiting output, and division of market issues created via the
cartelization of horizontal licensing agreements.210
The technology transfer provisions, although useful, cannot substitute for
a well-developed competition policy addressing numerous other competition
related problems created by strong IPRs. 21 As the GOE transitions from a cen-
tralized, state-run economy to a free market, an appropriate competition policy
is necessary to address the pre-existing, as well as potential, allegations of anti-
competitive practices in the Egyptian market. Mergers and acquisitions are
often undertaken without adequate investigation regarding their impact on
market conditions and fair competition.1 2 A draft competition law, which
addresses these issues and sets up an impartial and independent Competition
Commission, has been proposed to Parliament. In order to maximize the
205. MASKUS, supra note 11, at 127; AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
206. Omer, supra note 8, at 558.
207. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Competition Policy and The
Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, TD/B/COM.2/CLP22, 3 (July 2, 2001), available at
www.unctad.org/en/docs//c2clp22.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter UNCTAD2].
208. Egypt has not passed a formal competition law. Bahaa Ali El Dean and Mahmoud Moheildin,
On the Formulation and Enforcement of Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The Case of Egypt, (THE
EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES, Working Paper No. 60, 2 2001).
209. Keith E. Maskus & Mohamed Lahouel, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in
Developing Countries, 23 THE WORLD ECONOMY 595, 604 (Apr. 2000).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 603-05.
212. El Dean & Moheildin, supra note 208, at 3, 23 tbl. 1 (listing recent acquisitions in Egypt by
number and value).
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benefits of stronger IPRs in Egypt, the draft competition needs to be passed and
enforced in concurrence with the full implementation of Law 82 of 2002.213
To the GOE's credit, passage of Law No. 17 of 1999 successfully resulted
in a public-private development agreement between the GOE and Siemens.
Siemens plans to invest EE 1 billion to design, construct, and commission a
new pharmaceutical plant during 2003 to 2005. Included in the deal is also
technology transfer training for Egyptian employees and proactive efforts to
214export. Moreover, passage of another commercial law, Law No. 8 of 1997 on
Investment Guarantees and Incentives provides numerous incentives for
Egyptians and foreigners to invest in specific sectors as well as eliminates some
obstacles to foreign direct investment. 2 5 This law will likely prove very helpful
once Law No. 82 of 2002 is fully and properly implemented. Pfizer, the largest
pharmaceutical and health care product manufacturer in the world, declined to
build a new, state-of-the-art production facility in Egypt because of its distrust
of Egypt's willingness to enforce its new IPR law.216 The fact that foreign firns
are seriously considering foreign direct investment, but for the enforcement of
IPRs, is a positive sign that Law No. 82 of 2002, in conjunction with other
commercial laws, may produce the anticipated results.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Passage of Egyptian Law No. 82 of 2002 sent out a clear message to the
international business community that Egypt is serious about its WTO commit-
ments with respect to intellectual property rights. Despite this important
development, intellectual property rights do not exist in a vacuum. They are
closely linked and affected by competition policies, foreign direct investment
laws, and regulatory schemes. Therefore, passing the law is only the first step.
Egypt needs to "provide incentives to enterprises and institutions ... for the
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer ... in order to create
a sound and viable technology base. 21 7 In order for this to come about, numer-
ous related issues must be directly addressed and actions must be taken in order
to maximize the benefits from the new law.
First, there needs to be internal improvements in the regulatory schema.
The patent process should be linked with the drug registration process in order
213. Id. at 27-30 (describing the draft competition law currently in parliament).
214. Al- Ali, supra note 88, at 313.
215. Riad, supra note 199, at 117-20; see generally Samiha Fawzy, The Business Environment in
Egypt, (THE EGYPTIAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES, Working Paper no. 34 1998) (discussing the various
obstacles faced by the Egyptian private sector in its attempts to compete in the global market).
216. Mostafa, supra note 138.
217. TRIPS, supra note 19, at art. 66(2).
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to speed up the latter process as well as assure consistent case handling." 8 The
patent process should be solely controlled by the Patent Office, rather than the
Ministry of Health, so as to avoid inconsistent treatment and delayed results.2t 9
Patent examiners and judges need to be properly trained to handle sophisticated
patent applications and disputes. 220  A national intellectual property council
should be created to oversee the granting of compulsory licenses rather than
placing the decision at the sole discretion of one ministry.22' The price control
system needs to be reformed to incorporate promotion spending, inflation,
exchange rate changes, and costs of raw materials.222
Second, economic incentives and public policies need to be adopted in
order to support the local pharmaceutical industry through the initial transition
phase. The government should take an active role in developing R&D in the
nation through more public-private partnerships, a national network of govern-
ment and university officials, tax incentives, and direct funding of R&D
activities. 22' An emphasis can be placed on incremental product development
rather than new products that require economies of scale.224 Exports should be
encouraged through tax incentives and technical support programs that can
prepare local firms competing in the global market for the first time. The local
firms should be encouraged to specialize in the phyto-pharmaceuticals sub-
industry by developing plant extracts and herbal drugs from Egypt's abundant
plants. 225
Third, other legal regimes need to be reformed. Adoption of an adequate
competition law is necessary in order to protect the market from anti-competi-
tive practices by patent holders.226 Commercial laws impacting foreign direct
investment decisions are required to fully exploit technology transfer opportuni-
ties that arise from a stronger IPR regime. Insurance and health care policies
need to accommodate the fundamental changes in the market that will inevitably
take place. Adequate health insurance coverage needs to be expanded to cover
218. AmCham, supra note 9, at 20.
219. Wahish, supra note 86.
220. AmCham, supra note 9, at 27; Lanjouw, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that patent examiners need
advanced degrees and work experience in the relevant sciences in order to properly perform their job duties).
221. Wahish, supra note 86.
222. AmCham, supra note 9, at 27.
223. Id. See WTO WORKING GROUP ON TRADE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 197,
'j 14, 16 (supporting "capacity building through specific projects and programs and by establishing a
scientific and technological infrastructure on a cooperative basis for both the public and private research
facilities" and "joint research and technology upgrading efforts by enterprises and Governments").
224. AmCham, supra note 9, at 26.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 27; See generally UNCTAD2, supra note 207, at 20-23 (describing the various ways in
which competition policies with respect to IPRs need to be developed in order to promote innovation).
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a larger percentage of the disproportionately poor population and shield them
from price fluctuations.227
It is essential that these issues are identified and the linkages are made so
that poor, developing nations do not idealistically expect that merely changing
their IPR regime will automatically produce the proclaimed benefits espoused
by the wealthy, western nations. To its credit, some of these issues have been
and are currently being addressed by the GOE. For example, laws pertaining
to export promotion, money laundering, special economic zones, and chambers
of commerce have recently been passed by parliament. Meanwhile, the Unified
Corporate Tax Law, the Anti-Trust and Competition Law, the Unified Labor
Law, the Anti-Dumping Law, and the Information Technology Agreement are
currently undergoing parliamentary debate.228 Passing such laws is an important
first step. However, due to Egypt's limited human and financial resources, the
nation will inevitably face numerous obstacles as it attempts to properly address
such a variety of inter-linked issues.
Ideally, the developed nations will protect its own economic interests in
meeting the TRIPS objective to "reduce distortions and impediments to inter-
national trade... and ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellec-
tual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade[,] 229
by actively supporting, financially and technologically, nations like Egypt in
their challenging endeavor to fully and equally benefit from the strengthening
of intellectual property rights. Otherwise, developing nations' fears of becom-
ing mere consumer targets for wealthy pharmaceutical MNEs, (rather than
producers and beneficiaries of intellectual property rights) may materialize. If
so, governments of developing nations will understandably protect their own
interests and exploit compulsory licensing authority to the detriment of MNEs,
fail to address gray market issues, and allow weak enforcement mechanisms to
prevail, undermining the long-term sustainability of international intellectual
property rights.
227. Wahish, supra note 86; Niveen Wahish, Health Care Trip-Up, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE,
March 7-13, 2002, at http://weekly.ahram.org..eg2003/576/ec4.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
228. THE AMERICANCHAMBEROFCOMMERCE INEGYPT, Legislative Update, at http://www.amcham-
egypt.org/BSAC/WatchBulletin/BacklssuesfWBJul 102.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
229. TRIPS, supra note 19, at Preamble.
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